Religion and Gender across Europe by Voicu, Malina
www.ssoar.info
Religion and Gender across Europe
Voicu, Malina
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Voicu, M. (2009). Religion and Gender across Europe. Social Compass, 56(2), 144-162. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0037768609103350
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-443569
social
compass
56(2). 2009. 144-162
Malina VOICU
Religion and Gender across Europe
European societies have experienced a decrease in the social importance o f  
religious issues. Values and attitudes towards gender roles have also changed 
in the last decades. In European countries, people have become more egalitar­
ian with respect to the position o f women in society. The author tries to iden­
tify the relationship between secularization and changes in gender values. As 
a result o f  secularization, the individual value system has become fragmented 
and religious values have lost their coordinating role. The investigation employs 
cross-national and longitudinal analysis o f European Values Survey data (1990, 
1999), most o f  the European countries being included in the study’. The results 
indicate the decreasing impact o f  traditional religious belief on values related to 
gender roles during the 1990s in Europe and a common pattern o f  relationships 
between gender values and religiosity in most European societies.
Key words: religiosity ■ gender values ■ secularization ■ European Values Survey
L'importance sociale de la religion a diminué dans les sociétés européennes. 
Les valeurs et les attitudes de la population ont aussi évolué durant les der­
nières décennies. Dans tous les pays européens, la population est devenue 
plus égalitaire en ce qui concerne la position des femmes dans la société. 
L'auteure essaie d'identifier la relation entre la sécularisation et le change­
ment de valeurs des genres. Du fa it de la sécularisation, le système de valeurs 
individuelles devient plus fragmenté et les valeurs religieuses ont perdu leur 
rôle de guide. L 'investigation se porte sur des comparaisons transversales et 
longitudinales se fondant sur les données des European Values Surveys (1990, 
1999), la majorité des pays européens étant inclus dans l'étude. Les résultats 
indiquent une diminution de l'impact de la religion sur les valeurs des hom­
mes et des femmes dans les années 1990, ainsi que l'existence d'une trame de 
relations entre la religion et les valeurs des genres dans la plupart des sociétés 
européennes.
Mots-clés: religiosité ■ valeurs de genre ■ sécularisation ■ European Values Survey
Introduction
Over the last few decades, European societies have experienced a decrease in 
the social importance of religious issues. Even if the secularization thesis is 
a controversial one, empirical research data have proven that both religious
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practices and religious beliefs have decreased in Europe. However, the values 
and attitudes towards gender roles have also changed in the same period. In 
all European countries, attitudes have become more egalitarian with respect to 
the position of women in society. This article tries to identify the relationship 
between secularization and changes in gender values in Europe, analyzing the 
impact of traditional Christian values on attitudes towards women’s participation 
in paid employment and towards women’s role as housekeeper. The investiga­
tion employs cross-national and longitudinal analysis of two waves of EVS data 
(1990, 1999/2000).
The article is structured in five parts. The first summarizes theoretical 
approaches to secularization and its impact on public and private gender values, 
formulating some hypotheses about the relationships between the investigated 
phenomena. The second part presents the data used, the measurement meth­
ods and the analytical strategy, and the third is dedicated to the results. The last 
sections contain the conclusions and discussion.
1. Secularization and gender values
Secularization and changing gender roles are both part of a major cultural shift 
in Europe and North America over the last half century. Many studies have 
mentioned that the high level of economic prosperity and social security have 
changed people’s religious orientation and gender relationships (Inglehart, 
1990; Inglehart, Halman and Weltzel, 2004; Lundmark, 1995). Industrializa­
tion, urbanization and modernization have secularized society, decreasing the 
social importance of religion. According to Inglehart and Norris (2003), the first 
step in changing gender roles is related to industrialization, and the second to 
post-industrialization. The industrialization process set women free from tra­
ditional gender relationships, while post-industrialization established equality 
between the sexes.
Numerous studies have emphasized the direct relationship between religious 
values and gender values. Sherkat (2000) and Hofstede (1980, 1991) point out 
the association between Judeo-Christian culture and a patriarchal orientation 
towards gender roles. The Christian tradition has flourished on the basis of 
masculine cultures, which stress the differences between men and women and 
attribute different gender roles. On the other hand, Inglehart (1990) indicates 
that religious norms have had a functional role in traditional society. They have 
kept the family together, where the family was the main economic unit. Other 
studies have demonstrated the great influence of religious beliefs and practices 
on attitudes towards gender roles (Sherkat and Ellison, 1999; Ghazel, 2003; 
Wilcox and Jelen, 1991; Peek, Lowe and Williams, 1991; Gay, Ellison and 
Powers, 1996; Thornton, Alwin and Combum, 1983; Sherkat, 2000; Hertel 
and Hughes, 1987). They have shown that religiously affiliated people are 
more inclined to support unequal gender roles and to consider that women are 
first of all housekeepers and mothers. Some studies have identified a simi­
lar relationship at the macro level. Hofstede (1980, 1991) has classified coun­
tries according to the main gender role orientation: countries with a masculine 
culture and countries with a feminine culture, encouraging gender equality.
Using Hofstede’s classification, Verweij, Easter and Nauta (1997) observe that 
those countries with a feminine culture are more secularized than those with a 
masculine one.
Studies focused on religiosity have pointed out that, in Europe, the social 
significance of religion has decreased in the last centuries due to industrializa­
tion, urbanization and modernization. Secularization is the direct consequence 
of differentiation on the institutional level. The institutional spheres become 
more and more independent of one another and produce their own sets of rules 
and their own rationalities, different from those hitherto imposed by religion 
(Dobbelaere, 1981). Therefore, the churches have been eliminated from the 
areas in which, traditionally, they used to exert their control (Berger, 1969). The 
other social institutions have become autonomous (Tschannen, 1991) and trans­
ferred lay functions, such as education, healthcare and leisure, from the religious 
institutions (Willaime, 2001).
The impact of religion has diminished on the individual level, too. In tra­
ditional society, individual beliefs and practices depended on the norms pre­
scribed by the church and on the practices of the local community (Halman and 
Draulans, 2004). Urbanization and modernization have broken community ties; 
the individual becomes free to adapt the religious practices to her/his own sys­
tem of beliefs and lifestyle. Thus, individuals are free to build their own belief 
system and the result is a bricolage or patchwork (Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski, 
1995a; Hervieu-Leger, 1998). These systems combine elements that come from 
different traditions and religions.
In the light of the fragmentation of individual value systems, religion has 
lost its guiding role on the individual level (Ester, Halman and de Moor, 1993). 
Within the individual value system each subsystem comes to function inde­
pendently, developing its own internal logic. Several studies have pointed out 
the decreasing impact of religious values on other value orientations in the 
last decades (Halman, Petterson and Verweij, 1999; Halman, Petterson, 1996; 
Scheepers, Te Grothenhuis and van der Silk, 2002). The influence of religion on 
morality, politics, sexuality and family life has diminished.
In the context of secularization and the fragmentation of individual value systems, 
one can expect that the impact of traditional Christian religiosity on gender values 
will also decrease. Summarizing, one can formulate the following hypothesis:
(HI): The association between gender values and traditional Christian 
religious values has decreased in the last decade due to secularization.
However, the impact of secularization is not the same in all life domains. Sec­
ularization has affected mainly the values related to the public sphere, while the 
impact of religion on private issues remains stronger (Berger, 1969; Luckmann, 
1967; Halman, Petterson and Verweij, 1999; Halman and Petterson, 1996; 
Thompson, 1996). Halman and Petterson (2004) have shown that the influence 
of religiosity on political values has decreased. In terms of private issues, Berger 
(1969) and Halman, Petterson and Verweij (1999) indicate the strong impact of 
religious values on family matters and private life.
According to Wilcox and Jelen (1991), attitudes towards gender roles 
have two distinct dimensions: a public dimension, which refers to women’s
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involvement in the labour market and politics, and a private dimension related 
to domestic roles. Due to the lack of empirical data, I will restrict my analy­
sis of the public dimension to the relationship between religiosity and attitudes 
towards women’s involvement in the labour market. In addition, I will test the 
effect of religious values on attitudes towards domestic roles. Based on the find­
ings of previous research, the following hypotheses can be stated:
(H2): Religious values will have a greater influence on values related to 
private gender relationships, while the influence of religion on attitudes to 
women’s participation in the formal labour market will be weaker.
(H3) The impact of religiosity on values related to women’s participation 
in paid work will strongly diminish, while the impact on private gender 
values will slightly reduce over time.
However, the level of secularization differs from one country to another. 
Dogan (1999) shows that Western Europe is more diverse from the religious 
point of view than from the economic and social one. Remond (2003) indicates 
that there are many “Europes” from the secularization perspective and these 
“Europes” overlap with the main religious denominations. Therefore the particu­
lar country’s effect on the impact of religious values on gender values has to be 
taken into account during the analysis.
Some categories of people within the same society are more influenced by 
secularization than others. Studies dedicated to the subject have pointed out 
that men are more exposed to secularization than women (Dogan, 1999; Hayes, 
McAllister and Studlar, 2000; Halman and Draulans, 2004). And educated peo­
ple and the younger generation are less willing to accept religion inference in 
other life domains.
2. Data, measurement and analytical strategy
The analysis uses data from two waves of the European Values Survey, 1990 and 
1999. These provide comparable data with the respect to religiosity and gender 
values.
The comfirmatory factor analysis shows that there are two dimensions 
of gender values (see the factorial structure in Figure 1 below). The first, 
Household Traditionalism, indicates individual attitudes towards private 
gender relationships, stressing the preference for the traditional role of 
women within the household, as mother and housekeeper. It is built from 
the responses to the question: “How much do you agree with each of the 
following statements?”
• A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship 
with her children as a mother who does not work.
• A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
• A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children.
• Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
The second indicator, Equal Labour, refers to the attitude towards women’s 
involvement in the labour market. The latent variable explains the variation in 
responses to the question: “How much do you agree with each of the following 
statements?”:
• A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship 
with her children as a mother who does not work.
• Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent 
person.
• Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household 
income.
The answer categories vary from 1 to 4, 1 meaning “strongly agree” and 
4 representing “strongly disagree”. The measurement model for gender values 
has been validated by previous analyses and it fits the data for cross-sectional 
and longitudinal analyses (Voicu, 2004; Voicu and Voicu, 2002). The model fits 
the data from both the 1990 and the 1999 EVS.
The lack of empirical data does not allow the investigation of other forms of 
religiosity such as popular religion, or belief in saints or in the Virgin Mary. The 
analysis was therefore restricted to the effect of traditional Christianity on gender 
values. With respect to religious values, a few indicators have been employed: 
Importance of God, which indicates, according to Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski 
(1995b), the centrality of the religious beliefs. The indicator uses the answer 
to the question: “How important is God in your life?” measured on a 10-point 
scale. Orthodoxy is a summative scale built from the positive answers to the 
questions: “Do you believe in God, life after death, sin, Heaven and Hell?” The 
scale takes values from 0 to 5 and indicates the number of traditional religious 
beliefs held by the individual. Confidence in Church is a summative scale built 
from positive answers to the questions: “Do you think your church in your coun­
try offers adequate answers to moral problems, problems of family life, people’s 
spirituals needs and social problems?” The values vary from 0 to 4, showing the 
degree to which people rely on the church for solving individual and social prob­
lems. Religiosity is a latent factor, built as a factorial score, which aggregates the 
three indicators related to religious values: Importance of God, Orthodoxy and 
Confidence in church.
Other socio-demographic indicators have been used as control variables. 
Education was measured as the age when education was completed. Country of 
residence was recorded as a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent 
was a resident of the indicated country or not. France was used as a reference 
category.
The relationship between religiosity and gender values was investigated 
using Structural Equations Modeling available in AMOS. The path diagram, 
presented in Figure 1 investigates the impact of religiosity on the two gender 
values, Household Traditionalism and Equal Labour. The model was run first on 
the 1999 data set and this analysis provided the coefficients (regression weights 
and covariation) presented in Figure 1. The model fits the data, as indicated by 
the Fit indexes presented below the path diagram. Austria, Ireland and Northern 
Ireland have been excluded because for them a different scale was used for
148 Social Compass 56(2)
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FIGURE 1
Structural equation model: the effect of religiosity on gender values
Fit indexes: delta2 IFI = 0.945; CFI = 0.945; RMSEA = 0.05; P test for close fit = 0.484
measuring attitudes towards gender roles. Turkey has been excluded from the 
analysis as well.
The next step was to constrain all the parameters according to the results for 
the entire 1999 data set and to run the model for each of the countries included 
in the survey. The model fits the data for most European countries included in 
the 1999 survey. For a few countries, the model does not fit the data and these 
countries have been excluded from the cross-sectional comparisons. These coun­
tries are Portugal, Demnark, Iceland, Romania and Malta. The model’s fit is 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The third step consisted in running the model on the 1990 data set, 
constraining the parameters to the values resulting from the 1999 analysis 
on the entire sample. Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania have been excluded 
from the analysis because the questions concerning religious issues were 
not asked. As indicated in Table A l, the model fits the data for most of 
the countries included in the sample, excepting Iceland, Latvia and 
Poland. Therefore for most countries the longitudinal and cross-sectional 
comparisons are valid.
In the next step, the effects of religiosity on Household Traditionalism and on 
Equal Labour were compared for different countries and for different moments 
in time (1990 and 1999). The model was run for each country included in the 
1999 sample and, in the first stage, the values of coefficients indicating reli­
giosity effects on gender values were compared for European countries. The 
next phase kept constrained the model parameters for each country on the level 
revealed by the analysis of 1999 data, and compared the effects of religiosity on 
gender values in 1990 and 1999, country by country. The indices for the model’s 
fit in comparing each country in 1990 and 1999 are presented in the Table A2 in 
the Appendix.
The last step analyzed the impact of religiosity on the level of gender values, 
controlling for the socio-demographic variables of age, sex, education and coun­
try of residence. For each dependent variable (Household Traditionalism and 
Equal Labour) an Ordinary Last Square Regression Analysis was carried out for 
the entire sample for both the 1999 and the 1990 data. Additional OLS Regres­
sion Analyses were carried out for each country which provided comparable data 
for 1990 and 1999, and for which the model fit the data in both waves. The goal 
was to detect the effect of religious values on private and public gender values 
controlling for some individual characteristics, and to detect changes occurring 
over the decade.
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3. Results
The path diagram shown in the Figure 1 indicates a strong positive impact of 
religiosity on traditionalist orientations towards private gender relationships, 
while the effect on gender values related to women’s employment is weak 
and not significant. The data support hypothesis H2, which predicts a stronger 
effect of religiosity on private gender roles but a non-significant effect on public 
ones. Therefore, one can say that in Europe religiosity still plays an important 
role in determining gender relationships within families, but the values related 
to women’s involvement in paid labour have been more strongly affected by 
secularization.
Figures 2 and Figure 3 present the variation of unstandarsized regression 
effects of religiosity on Household Traditionalism and on Equal Labour among 
European countries in 1999, while Figures 4 and 5 show the variation of these 
regression coefficients between 1990 and 1999 in various countries. Looking at 
the impact of religiosity on private and public gender values country by country, 
a similar pattern can be observed in many European countries. The data reported 
in Figure 2 indicate a strong impact of religiosity on attitudes related to private 
gender relationships in most European countries. In almost all European societ­
ies, these relationships are strongly influenced by Christian religiosity, which 
encourages a traditional pattern of relationships and role division within the 
household.
However, the impact differs from one country to another. The data 
indicate a higher secularization of the private sphere in some of the ex- 
communist countries. The impact is non-significant in Russia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria and Latvia; but Belarus, Lithuania and Croatia have lower scores 
compared to other countries in Europe. Not all the post-communist countries 
are similar in this respect, Romania and Hungary registering higher effects 
of religiosity on gender values; but in the ex-Soviet bloc countries, the pri­
vate sphere is more secularized compared with either Western, Central, or 
Eastern Europe.
The data presented in Figure 3 show that the public sphere is more secular­
ized with respect to gender relationships than the private one. For many European 
countries, the impact of religious values on values related to women’s participa­
tion in the labour market is weak and non-significant. Only in a few countries 
is religiosity important in determining attitudes to public gender relationships.
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FIGURE 2
Unstandardized effects of religiosity on Household 
Traditionalism (1999)
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FIGURE 3
Unstandardized effects of religiosity on Equal Labour (1999)
B e lg iu m  
H u ng a ry  
S lo ven ia  
S lo vak ia  
S pain  
L a tv ia  
P o land  
F rance 
B u lga ria  
F in land  
C zech R e p u b lic  
Ita ly 
D enm ark 
N e the rla n ds  
U n ited  K in g d o m  
P ortu g a l
- 0.6
□
]
FIGURE 4
Differences between unstandardized effects of religiosity on 
Household Traditionalism (1990, 1999)
FIGURE 5
Unstandardized effects of religiosity on Equal Labour—comparison
1990-1999
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Thus, in Germany, Spain, Malta, Finland, The Netherlands, France, Belarus and 
Romania, religiosity plays an important role in influencing attitudes to women’s 
involvement in the labour market (the effect of Religiosity on Equal Labour is 
more that +/-0.1). In the first six mentioned countries a higher level of religi­
osity discourages women’s participation in paid work, while in Romania and 
Belarus it encourages it. Again, the countries from the ex-Soviet Union have 
higher levels of secularization of the labour market, but they are not unique in 
this respect.
Generally speaking, the data confirm the hypothesis of higher seculariza­
tion of the values related to women’s employment and of the significant impact 
of religion on private life. In almost all the countries, the effect of religion 
on private gender values is more important than on opinions about women’s 
labour market involvement. In Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and Latvia, both 
dimensions are strongly affected by secularization, the impact of religiosity 
being weak.
Looking to the data from a longitudinal perspective, in many European 
countries one notices a decrease in the effect of religiosity on Household Tra­
ditionalism between 1990 and 1999. EVS data indicate a higher decline for 
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Portugal and an increase in case of 
Belgium (see Figure 4). For the other countries the variation was significantly 
less and for many of them the impact of religious values on private gender values 
also declined over the 10 years.
The variation of religiosity’s impact on values related to women’s 
employment does not follow a common pattern in Europe (see Figure 5). 
In the case of The Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Italy, France and Poland 
there is a significant decrease in the effect of religion on values related to 
women’s employment outside the home. For Spain the data show an increase 
in the effect of religiosity on Equal Labour, while for the other countries 
the variation is not significant. Therefore, no significant variation can be 
observed.
Figures 6 and 7 show the variation of Household Traditionalism and Equal 
Labour by religiosity among European Countries in 1990 and 1999. The data 
in suggest a transformation in the effect of religious values on gender values 
during this decade in most European countries. Figure 6 indicates a higher 
impact of religiosity on Household Traditionalism in 1990 than in 1999. The 
data in Figure 7 show a similar pattern. The data point to a decrease in religi­
osity and an increase in support for women’s involvement into the paid labour 
market.
Is this change the effect of religiosity decreasing or do other factors play an 
important role here? To find out the effect of religiosity on the dependent vari­
ables while controlling for other significant factors, an OLS Regression Analy­
sis was employed. The results of the analysis, included in Table 1, indicate that 
the impact of religiosity on gender values is still strong when controlling for 
age, education, gender and country. On both dimensions of gender values, the 
effect of religion is significant, and a decrease occurs only in the case of val­
ues related to women’s participation in paid labour. In 1990, the impact was 
stronger than in 1999, while in case of private gender values a slight increase is 
discernible.
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FIGURE 6
Household Traditionalism by religiosity (1990, 1999)
On the other hand, the OLS Regression Analysis indicates that other factors, 
such as gender, age and education, play an important role in determining pub­
lic and private gender values in both data sets. Age is not significant for val­
ues related to labour market participation in both 1990 and 1999. In addition, 
country has an important effect on public and private gender values. The effect 
of religious denomination on gender values was tested too, but the impact was 
not significant and it did not add supplementary explanation for the model.
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An OLS Regression Analysis was also carried out for each country in 
both years (the results are not included in the present paper, but the author 
can provide them upon request). The regression was run on 12 countries, 
with Household Traditionalism and Equal Labour as dependent variables. 
The goal was to analyze the variation of religiosity’s effect on gender values, 
controlling for age, education and gender. The results sustain the findings 
reported.
SW99
BG99 PT90
FR99
HU99
SL99
GR99
■
'  SK99
CZ99 
□ n
DE99
DK90 EE99 °
O ■ O
DDR90 N090
^Z 9 0  °O
BG90O
BE9»
LU99
LA99
UA99
B Y 9 Í
RÜÇ9
FI90 ES90 O
FI99
LT99
HU90O O
SK90
LA90O
BE90
W Œ 9 0  UK90 O o
NL99
HR99
IT99
IT90
PL99
PL9Ü
NL90 o  1990 1999
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 
Religiosity
2.00 2.25 2.50
FIGURE 7 
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TABLE 1
Results of Ordinary Last Square Regression Analysis. Dependent variables: Equal Labour and Household
Traditionalism
1999 1990
Equal Labour Household Equal Labour Household
Traditionalism Traditionalism
B Beta B Beta B Beta B Beta
(Constant) 4.031 3.722 3.998 4.24
Religiosity -0.12 -0.138 0.396 0.362 -0.144 -0.172 0.387 0.342
Gender (female) 0.203 0.129 -0.236 -0.119 0.193 0.123 -0.223 -0.105
Age 0.001 0.026(ns) 0.007 0.127 0 0.006(ns) 0.011 0.173
Education 0.006 0.04 -0.022 -0.113 0.006 0.037 -0.03 -0.148
United Kingdom -0.523 -0.117 -0.402 -0.071 -0.411 -0.125 -0.691 -0.155
Germany -0.082 -0.026 -0.628 -0.156
West Germany -0.406 -0.145 -0.374 -0.099
East Germany -0.204 -0.059 -0.421 -0.09
Italy -0.193 -0.06 -0.154 -0.038 -0.174 -0.061 -0.355 -0.092
Spain -0.114 -0.028 -0.514 -0.1 -0.081 -0.032** -0.588 -0.172
Netherlands -0.736 -0.166 -0.577 -0.103 -0.838 -0.213 -0.46 -0.086
Belgium -0.06 -0.018** -0.215 -0.052 -0.32 -0.13 -0.214 -0.064
Finland -0.304 -0.07 -0.253 -0.046 -0.076 -0.015(ns) -0.479 -0.069
Slovakia 0.121 0.031 -0.137 -0.028 -0.275 -0.074 -0.111 -0.022**
Hungary 0.050 0.011(ns) 0.085 0.015** -0.329 -0.083 0.222 0.041
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Bulgaria 0.139 0.031 -0.042 -0.007(ns)
Slovenia 0.053 0.012(ns) -0.182 -0.032
Poland -0.04 -0.009(ns) -0.067 -0.012(ns)
Sweden 0.157 0.036 -0.533 -0.095
Estonia -0.228 -0.051 0.111 0.02
Lithuania -0.169 -0.038 0.217 0.039
Croatia 0.008 0.002(ns) -0.331 -0.059
Greece 0.140 0.034 -0.082 -0.015*
Russia -0.203 -0.07 0.23 0.063
Luxembourg -0.112 -0.028 -0.09 -0.018*
Ukraine -0.075 -0.018** 0.211 0.041
Belarus -0.096 -0.022** 0.088 0.016*
Latvia -0.036 -0.008(ns) -0.092 -0.016**
Portugal 
Denmark 
Norway 
Czech Republic
R 0.294 0.509
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.258
* significant for p < 0.05, all other coefficient excepting (ns) are significant at p < 0.001. 
** significant for p < 0.01.
-0.374
-0.038
-0.096 0.652
-O.OlO(ns) -0.001
0.124
0.000(ns)
0.456
- 0.122
-0.188
-0.250
0.337
0.113
0.125
-0.031
-0.052
-0.089
-0.277
-0.743
-0.612
0.324
0.562
0.315
-0.056
-0.14
-0.126
0.086
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Conclusions
This articles has investigated the impact of religion on gender values, using 
1990 and 1999 EVS data. The approach was a comparative cross-sectional 
and longitudinal one, trying to find what impact traditional Christian religios­
ity has on gender values in different European countries, and to identify pos­
sible variation. The data support the hypothesis of a stronger effect of religion 
on private gender values in all European countries. Even controlling for the 
influence of other factors, the effect remains. The impact of religiosity on 
values related to women’s labour market involvement is weaker and the data 
indicate a decrease in this effect over the last decade. There is no universal 
pattern, but the analysis shows a common trend in many countries. The avail­
able data indicate that, in Europe, while traditional Christian religion has a 
significant place in the private sphere, the labour market is free of “super­
natural” forces.
This fact has a direct impact on women’s status and on the negotiation of 
gender roles. The results indicate that traditional Christian religion does not 
represent a hindrance for women’s involvement in the labour market in many 
European societies. On the other hand, in most European countries, the Christian 
religion still prescribes how domestic work is shared within the family and 
domestic roles assigned, encouraging the preservation of traditional family 
relationships.
The article assumes that secularization has reduced gender inequality, both 
within the family and in the labour market; the empirical data confirm this 
hypothesis. However, both phenomena are part of the modernization process 
and the decrease in traditional values may be the leading force behind them. 
Due to the lack a solid indicator for traditionalism in the available data, the 
current research could not investigate the complex relationships among religi­
osity, gender equality and traditionalism, but this topic can be addressed in the 
future.
The results of the present research are also limited to the effect of tradi­
tional Christian values on gender values in European countries. They cannot be 
extrapolated to countries outside Europe or to the effect of other religious tradi­
tions. This could be an interesting topic for further research. On the other hand, 
although the current analysis emphasizes the effect of Christian religiosity on 
value orientations related to women’s position in the labour market, the public 
sphere cannot be reduced only to paid employment. Unfortunately, the lack of 
empirical data does not allow an extension of the analyses to other domains, 
such as women’s political participation or involvement in civil society. This also 
will be the subject of further research.
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TABLE A1
Model fit for 1990 and 1999 constraining all the parameters 
according to the results for the entire sample in 1999
Country 1999 1990
CFI RMSEA CFI RMSEA
France 0.944 0.049 0.937 0.056
United Kingdom 0.903 0.066 0.926 0.058
Germany 0.888 0.091
Italy 0.889 0.065 0.925 0.062
Spain 0.967 0.040 0.950 0.051
Portugal 0.697 0.091 0.832 0.082
Netherlands 0.929 0.610 0.917 0.073
Belgium 0.923 0.058 0.961 0.042
Denmark 0.786 0.092 0.801 0.084
Sweden 0.876 0.067
Finland 0.872 0.066 0.871 0.082
Iceland 0.793 0.075 0.771 0.082
Estonia 0.945 0.046
Latvia 0.892 0.057 0.676 0.094
Lithuania 0.878 0.065
Poland 0.821 0.078 0.785 0.086
Czech Republic 0.929 0.056 0.938 0.061
Slovakia 0.964 0.049 0.950 0.053
Hungary 0.938 0.056 0.912 0.069
Romania 0.412 0.109
Bulgaria 0.949 0.046 0.901 0.068
Croatia 0.894 0.063
Greece 0.874 0.071
Russia 0.897 0.064
Malta 0.012 0.156
Luxembourg 0.911 0.058
Slovenia 0.957 0.048 0.920 0.061
Ukraine 0.813 0.084
Belarus 0.924 0.050
West Germany 0.925 0.066
East Germany 0.946 0.063
Entire sample 0.971 0.037 0.955 0.048
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TABLE A2
Indexes of fit for the constrained model by country
Model fit 1990 Model fit 1999
CFI RMSEA CFI RMSEA
France 0.926 0.062 0.979 0.039
United Kingdom 0.937 0.055 0.973 0.044
Germany 0.981 0.049
West Germany 0.994 0.020
East Germany 0.983 0.038
Italy 0.934 0.060 0.947 0.057
Spain 0.972 0.039 0.995 0.020
Portugal 0.908 0.063 0.909 0.070
Netherlands 0.973 0.043 0.977 0.044
Belgium 0.946 0.051 0.958 0.054
Denmark 0.948 0.044 0.960 0.051
Sweden 0.985 0.033
Finland 0.825 0.099 0.956 0.049
Iceland 0.916 0.061
Estonia 0.991 0.024
Latvia 0.832 0.070 0.995 0.016
Lithuania 0.981 0.033
Poland 0.914 0.044 0.981 0.032
Czech Republic 0.969 0.045 0.990 0.024
Slovakia 0.961 0.048 0.987 0.037
Hungary 0.952 0.053 0.979 0.041
Romania 0.934 0.046
Bulgaria 0.888 0.074 0.984 0.033
Croatia 0.980 0.035
Greece 0.972 0.043
Russia 0.983 0.034
Malta 0.945 0.047
Luxembourg 0.960 0.050
Slovenia 0.974 0.036 0.993 0.025
Ukraine 0.991 0.01
Belarus 0.982 0.031
